## An Introduction to Formal Methods in Software Engineering.

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## Definitions.

#### Formal Methods.

Formal methods are techniques used to model *systems* as mathematical entities.

Systems can be

- Digital architectures
- Physical/Biological phenomenons
- Social interaction schemes
- and...

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#### Formal Methods.

Formal methods are techniques used to model *systems* as mathematical entities.

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- Digital architectures
- Physical/Biological phenomenons
- Social interaction schemes
- and... softwares!

Formal methods: perks and drawbacks.

#### Perks.

Mathematical approaches to model softwares:

- Improve the precision of the design.
- Enable proofs of correctness.
- Permit the extraction of properties.

Overall reliability of the software



Formal methods: perks and drawbacks.

#### Drawbacks.

- Conception time increases dramatically.
- Models are simpler than real softwares.
- Lack of qualified workforce.

Time & money spent to build a software



Formal methods: when do we need them?

Development of safety-critical systems:

- Avionics
- Medicine
- Automotive
- Nuclear
- . . .

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Development of safety-critical systems:

- Avionics
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- Risks:
  - Loss of life/lives
  - Loss of resources (financial, natural...)

## Formal methods: when do we need them?

#### Critical bugs are real!

- Therac-25 radiation therapy, excessive quantities of beta radiation (1980s).
- ▶ Patriot Missile, floating point rounding error (1991).
- Ariane 5 failure, conversion from 64-bit floating to 16-bit signed (1996).
- Hitomi astronomical satellite destruction, thruster orientation bug (2016).
- See P.G.Neumann's list of Computer-related Risks [Neumann, 1995].

## What is bug? (baby don't hurt me...)

### Context.

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### Definition of a bug (failure).

"an undesired effect observed in the software's delivered service", [Abran, 2004].

#### Remark.

A bug is always related to the software *specification*.

## About Specification.

Specification expressed in natural language can be:

- incomplete (e.g, the autopilot program).
- ambiguous: "I want an autopilot program that avoid plane crashes on the ground."

## About Specification.

#### Formal specification.

- Removes the ambiguity.
- Limits: never sure about completeness.

#### Formal specification formats.

- Unified Modelling Language (UML).
- First Order Logic (FOL).
- Petri nets.
- Any formal languages...

Model checking.

...

- Automatic theorem proving.
- Deductive methods

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- Automatic theorem proving.
- **Deductive methods.**

### Deductive methods.



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"I want a program that **debits** a **non-negative amount** from an account if there's **enough money in the account**."

#### Formal specification.

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Debit} \in \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z} \to (\mathbb{Z} \ \cup \ \texttt{Err}) \to \{\top, \bot\} \equiv \\ \forall \textit{acc}, \textit{amnt} \in \mathbb{Z}, \\ \mid \textit{acc} \geq \textit{amnt} > 0 \Rightarrow \texttt{Debit}(\textit{acc}, \textit{amnt}, \textit{acc} - \textit{amnt}) \\ \mid \textit{amnt} \leq 0 \Rightarrow \texttt{Debit}(\textit{acc}, \textit{amnt}, \texttt{Err}) \\ \mid \textit{amnt} > \textit{acc} \Rightarrow \texttt{Debit}(\textit{acc}, \textit{amnt}, \texttt{Err}) \end{array}$$

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Formal specification.

Debit \in \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z} \to (\mathbb{Z} \cup \text{Err}) \to \{\top, \bot\} \equiv \forall acc, amnt \in \mathbb{Z}, \\ \mid acc \geq amnt > 0 \Rightarrow \text{Debit}(acc, amnt, acc - amnt) \\ \mid amnt \leq 0 \Rightarrow \text{Debit}(acc, amnt, \text{Err}) \\ \mid amnt > acc \Rightarrow \text{Debit}(acc, amnt, \text{Err}) \end{cases}
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#### Program implementation.

 $\forall acc, amnt \in \mathbb{Z},$ 

$$debit\_impl(acc, amnt) = egin{cases} acc-amnt & ext{if} (acc \geq amnt > 0) \ ext{Err} & otherwise \end{cases}$$

Proofs.

### Proofs.

#### Soundness:

 $\forall acc, amnt \in \mathbb{Z}, acc' \in \mathbb{Z} \cup Err,$  $debit\_impl(acc, amnt) = acc' \Rightarrow Debit(acc, amnt, acc').$ 

### Proofs.

#### Soundness:

 $\forall acc, amnt \in \mathbb{Z}, acc' \in \mathbb{Z} \cup Err, \\ debit_impl(acc, amnt) = acc' \Rightarrow Debit(acc, amnt, acc').$ 

#### Completeness:

 $\forall acc, amnt \in \mathbb{Z}, acc' \in \mathbb{Z} \cup Err$  $Debit(acc, amnt, acc') \Rightarrow debit_impl(acc, amnt) = acc'.$  Another example of program.

Formal specification  $\text{Sum} \in \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \in \{\top, \bot\} \equiv \forall n, m \in \mathbb{N}, m = \frac{n(n+1)}{2} \Rightarrow \text{Sum}(n, m)$ 

Program implementation.

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \ sumf(n) = egin{cases} 0 & ext{if } (n=0) \ n+sumf(n-1) & otherwise \end{cases}$$

Another example of program.

#### Formal specification

 $\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Sum} \in \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \in \{\top, \bot\} \equiv \forall n, m \in \mathbb{N}, \ m = \frac{n(n+1)}{2} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Sum}(n, m) \\ \text{or} \\ \forall n, m \in \mathbb{N}, \ \operatorname{Sum}(n, m) \equiv m = \frac{n(n+1)}{2} \end{array}$ 

Program implementation.

$$orall n \in \mathbb{N}, \ sumf(n) = egin{cases} 0 & ext{if} \ (n=0) \ n+sumf(n-1) & otherwise \end{cases}$$

## The Coq proof assistant.

Coq is one formal proof verifier among many (Isabelle, HOL, PVS...).



COQ PROOF ASSISTANT

## The Coq proof assistant.

Coq is one formal proof verifier among many (Isabelle, HOL, PVS...).

Use cases [Leroy, 2014].

- Basic mathematics theories (geometry, algebra...): e.g, Four Color Theorem proof [Gonthier, 2008].
- Complex algorithms, and protocols verification:
   e.g, *Boyer-Moore majority vote algorithm*, formalized by C.Paulin-Mohring.
- Program verification (written in Coq!).

# Coq demo.

## Conclusion.

Real need for formal methods for safety-critical softwares (especially as software *complexity increases*).

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- Adoption of formal methods, a 2-axis process:
  - 1. Training a qualified workforce.
  - Helping uninitiated developers (automatic theorem provers for main-stream programming languages).
    - e.g the Frama-C framework [Cuoq et al., 2012].

## Conclusion.

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- Adoption of formal methods, a 2-axis process:
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  - Helping uninitiated developers (automatic theorem provers for main-stream programming languages).
     e.g the *Frama-C* framework [Cuoq et al., 2012].
- Formal methods are not only for software engineering!
   e.g. Applications to digital architecture design.

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